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I. INTRODUCTION
Although neither the Uniform Land Transaction Act ("ULTA"), nor
the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act ("USLTA")2 has been
adopted by any state, both may have had an impact on the way we think
about modernizing state real property law. The Acts have been cited as
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secondary authority in judicial opinions,3 studied and analyzed in law
review articles,4 and referenced in reporter's notes in various Restate-
3. Gerald Komgold, Seller's Damages from a Defaulting Buyer of Realty: The Influence
of the Uniform Land Transactions Act on the Courts, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1069 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemp-
tion and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1993); Roger W. Andersen, Convey-
ancing Reform: A Great Place to Start, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 333 (1990); Marion
W. Benfield, Jr., The Future Advances Lender: Status Under Present Illinois Law and Under
ULTA and USOLTA, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 451; Curtis J. Berger, ULSIA and the Protected
Party: Evolution or Revolution?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 971 (1992); Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA's
Remedies on Default--Worth the Effort?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1001 (1992); Alan J. Blocher,
Due-on-Sale in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 49 (1981); Barbara
J. Britzke, Residential Real Estate Transactions: A Comparison of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act and Maryland Law, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 43 (1983); Ronald B. Brown,
Article I of the Uniform Land Transactions Act: Is Inconsistency with the UCC an Unneces-
sary Obstacle?, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585; Jon W. Bruce, An Overview of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 10 STETSON L. REV.
1 (1980); Jon W. Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform Under the Uniform Land Transactions Act,
64 GEO. L.J. 1245 (1976); Jon W. Bruce, The Role Uniform Real Property Acts Have Played
in the Development of American Land Law: Some General Observations, 27 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 331 (1992); Robert D. Brussack, Reform of American Conveyancing Formality, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1981); K. Tate Chambers, Comment, A Comparison Between Article 5
of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act and Present Illinois Mechanics' Lien
Law, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 563; Caryn M. Chittenden, Comment, From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Equity-The Implied Warranty of Quality Under the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571 (1992); Michael Cox & Michael McCue,
Comment, The Nebraska Construction Lien Act: Which Way to Lien?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 86
(1983); Meredith Craig, Symposium, The Uniform Land Transactions Act and The Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Potential Impact on Florida Law, 10 STETSON L. REV.
21 (1980); Allison Dunham, Reflections of a Drafter: Allison Dunham, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 569
(1982); Allison Dunham, Reflections of a Statutory Draftsman: The Land Transaction Acts,
1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 549; Allison Dunham, Statutory Reformation of Land Obligations, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982); Sara E. Dysart, USLTA: Article 5 "Construction Liens"
Analyzed in Light of Current Texas Law on Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens, 12 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 113 (1980); William J. Fields, Housing Defects: Homeowners' Remedies-A
Time for Legislative Action, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 72 (1981); Edwin M. Ginsburg, The
Doctrine of Merger with Respect to Real Estate Transactions: Taking the Bull by the Horns,
16 NOVA L. REV. 1171 (1992); Alan S. Gover & Glenn D. West, The Texas Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Process--A Proposal to Reconcile the Procedures Mandated by State Law with
the Fraudulent Conveyance Principles of the Bankruptcy Code, 43 Sw. L.J. 1061 (1990);
William H. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property
Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1985); James B. Hughes,
Jr., Future Advance Mortgages: Preserving the Benefits and Burdens of the Bargain, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101 (1994); Gerald Korngold, Construction Loan Advances and the
Subordinated Purchase Money Mortgagee: An Appraisal, a Suggested Approach, and the
ULTA Perspective, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 313 (1981); Robert Kratovil, Mortgage Law Today,
1096 [Vol. 20
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/9
1996] Mattis 1097
ments.5 This article focuses on the use of these proposed Acts in law
school classes and coursebooks.
Over a decade ago it was noted:
13 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 251 (1980); Andrew Lance, Balancing Private and Public
Initiatives in the Mortgage-Backed Security Market, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426
(1983); Linda M. Libertucci, Comment, Builder's Liability to New and Subsequent Purchas-
ers, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 219 (1991); Peter B. Maggs, Land Records of the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 491; B. Taylor Mattis, The
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Article 2-Conveyancing and Recording,
1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 511; John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title
Assurance in the Computer Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 61 (1992); John Mixon & Ira
B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief for Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSIA Section 511(B), 27
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 455 (1992); Sue Ortman, USLTA: Marketable Record Title Act--A
New Title Theory and Its Effect on Texas Law, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 462 (1980); James W.
Pedowitz, Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act--A Commentary, 13 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 696 (1978); James M. Pedowitz, USLTA-ULTA Perspective, 57 TITLE NEWS
23 (1978); Patricia E. Rant, ULTA and Non-Judicial Mortgage Foreclosure in Texas, 12 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1104 (1981); Maureen M. Rayborn, Comment, Uniform Land Transactions Act:
Pennsylvania Property Law and Sellers' Remedies for Breach of Contract for Sale of Real
Estate, 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 577 (1982); Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential
Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets,
64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261 (1991); David P. Schwartz, Note, BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corporation: Critiquing the Supreme Court's Method of Determining "Reasonably
Equivalent Value" Within the Context of Bankruptcy Foreclosures, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 345
(1995); Jeff Sovem, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the
Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists
under One Roof, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 13 (1993); Paul Teich, A Second Call for Abolition of
the Rule of Merger by Deed, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 543 (1994); Craig D. Tindall, The
Obligatory Advance Rule in the Construction Lending Context, 12-JAN CONSTRUCTION LAW
13 (1992); Comment, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Areas of Departure
from State Law, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 359 (1978); Note, Real Property-Warranties in the
Uniform Land Transactions Act of 1975-Progression or Retrogression for Pennsylvania?,
49 TEMPLE L.Q. 162 (1975).
An interesting spin-off from an idea presented in one of these law review articles
illustrates the value of comparison of a uniform act and present state law. An article dealing
with the formalities of conveyances under USLTA made the point that under the Act, a
writing is required for an effective transfer of an interest in real estate. No such requirement
was found in the Illinois statutes. Mattis, supra, at 514-16. A 45 page law review article
thoroughly analyzed the rather startling situation that no Illinois law prohibits the oral
transfer of land or makes such transfers unenforceable between the parties. Patrick M.
McFadden, Oral Transfers of Land in Illinois, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 667.
5. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 2.7 reporter's note (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1989); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) §§ 2.4, 3.1 reporters' notes (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1991); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.5 (Preliminary Draft No.
5, 1995).
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The Uniform Commercial Code suffered the same early rejection
that now threatens the proposed uniform property laws. A large part of
the solution for the rejection of the UCC was the widespread teaching
of the UCC in law schools. The same solution is now being used to
counter the rejection of ULTA and USOLTA. Those Acts have already
been the topics of panel discussions by the drafters and other experts at
meetings of property law teachers held during the annual meetings of
the Association of American Law Schools. Many property teachers,
including the author, regularly assign sections of ULTA and USOLTA
for comparison and analysis in the classroom. The better property
casebooks and hornbooks also utilize these Acts. As a result of this
exposure, future generations of lawyers will be familiar with ULTA and
USOLTA and will readily perceive their simplicity.6
The uses of ULTA and USLTA in coursebooks and classrooms vary
from brief presentations of the history of the development of the Acts7 to
informational references to, or quotations of, various provisions.' Some-
times, the use is aimed at supporting a "better view" espoused by an author.
Sometimes, the purpose is to provoke thought on how the provision, if
adopted, would affect judicial decisions previously discussed.' Sometimes,
6. Mattis, supra note 4, at 512.
7. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
PROPERTY LAW 456-57 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that the Acts have had an indirect impact on
the development of the law although neither has been adopted); JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 978-79, 1356 (6th ed. 1990) (suggesting that the Acts
be used as supplemental material); CHARLES DONAHUE, JR., ET AL., PROPERTY 572 (3d ed.
1993); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 155 (1984) (discussing the costs of complexity
and noting that "states have not rushed to adopt" USLTA, among the objects of which are
to reduce the costs of title examination and the risks of title defects).
8. CURTIS J. BERGER & QUINTIN JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 580 (4th
ed. 1993) (quoting U.L.T.A. § 2-302); EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA R. KWALL, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 799-801 (3d ed. 1992) (quoting U.L.T.A. § 2-
201); id. at 911 (summarizing marketable record title act provisions of U.S.L.T.A. part 3, art.
3).
9. See, e.g., BERGER & JOHNSTONE, supra note 8, at 437 (asking whether the ULTA
approach treating installment land contracts as mortgages is the best solution); RICHARD H.
CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 868 (1988) (discussing foreclo-
sure procedures under ULTA); id. at 915-17 (discussing provisions on warranties of quality);
CRIBBET, supra note 7, at 1015-16, 1020, 1031-32, 1075-76, 1207 n.5, 1279-80 (referring to
U.L.T.A. § 2-309 as strongest position so far suggested for implied warranty of quality); id.
at 1281, 1356; DONAHUE, supra note 7, at 574; SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVEN-
KAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 1081, 1099, 1171, 1180 (2d
ed. 1993).
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the Acts are used as richer and creative tools to spur students' thinking.
Examples of the latter treatment are explored in this article.
II. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
At some point during the first-year property law course, the statute of
frauds comes up. In teaching it, and the jurisprudence that goes with first-
year courses generally, I try to lead students to consider whether certain
judge-made doctrines are usurpations of legislative prerogatives.
A typical statute of frauds may provide that "[n]o action shall be
brought... upon any contract for the sale of lands... unless the agreement
... or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing ... ,"' or
"[e]very contract.., for the sale of any lands ... shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof... is in writing ....
Judges apply doctrines of their own creation, such as part performance or
estoppel, to "take" certain situations "out of' the statute of frauds. Do not
courts contradict the legislature when they create and utilize doctrines to
enforce contracts for the sale of land absent a writing? In most states, these
doctrines are not mentioned in the statute, which pretty clearly speaks in
terms of "no action" and "every contract." Here, section 2-201 of the
ULTA makes the point for me. It provides for what, if adopted, would be
a legislative pronouncement of the doctrines.
(a) [E]xcept as provided in subsection (b), a contract to convey real
estate is not enforceable by judicial proceeding unless there is a writing
(b) A contract not evidenced by a writing... is enforceable if:.
(2) the buyer has taken possession of the real estate and has paid
all or a part of the contract price;
(4) either party, in reasonable reliance upon the contract and upon
the continuing assent of the party against whom enforcement is sought,
has changed his position to the extent that an unreasonable result can be
avoided only by enforcing the contract ....
Students, seeing a legislative enactment of the doctrines that takes the
situation "out of' the general rule of the statute, can be persuaded that the
10. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1995).
11. MiNN. STAT. § 513.05 (1988).
12. U.L.T.A. § 2-201.
1996] 1099
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exceptions are properly within the legislative, rather than judicial, domain.
Professor Goldstein uses section 2-201 of ULTA to make a similar point
when he asks, just before quoting the section, whether there are "better
devices than the present statutes of frauds 'to avoid perjury on the one hand
and fraud on the other' ?
' 13
In their coursebook, Real Estate Transfer, Finance and Development,
Professors Nelson and Whitman use ULTA's statute of frauds provision for
a different purpose. 4 They make the point that part performance usually
requires at least two of three acts: payment of part (or all) of the purchase
price; going into possession of the realty; and making substantial improve-
ments. The commissioner's comment is then quoted: "'Mere taking
possession of the real estate is not sufficient to satisfy the statute, but
possession with part payment or possession with the change of position
described in subsection (b)(4) is sufficient.""..5 Nelson and Whitman pose
the query whether the commissioner's comment is consistent with the text
of section 2-201(b)(4). This exercise presents an excellent opportunity for
students to consider the weight of the drafter's commentary in interpreting
uniform statutes. All the while, students may think they are merely studying
real property law. Giving students a hefty dose of jurisprudence or statutory
interpretation in the context of substantive courses can go a long way in
training future lawyers to be professionally competent.
II. OTHER FORMALITIES OF A CONVEYANCE
Section 2-201 of USLTA dispenses with the requirements of an
acknowledgment, seal, and witnesses. Having presented a problem in which
these formalities were omitted 16 and relevant cases, Professors Rabin and
Kwall quote section 2-201 of USLTA and refer to the official comments
following it. They then ask whether dispensing with these formalities takes
care of the issues in the problem posed. They discuss Brussack's arguments
supporting the USLTA position and his suggestion that USLTA would
prevent litigation from arising when these ceremonies are improperly
13. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 70 (Rev. 2d ed. 1988); GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 7, at 194-95.
14. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 38 (4th ed. 1992). These authors cite to ULTA
on 18 pages of the coursebook, and to USLTA on 2 pages, many pages of which cite the
uniform acts numerous times. These citations occur in the first 276 pages of the coursebook
in the part dealing with real estate transfer.
15. Id. (quoting U.L.T.A. § 2-201 cmt. 3)
16. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 773-74.
1100 [Vol. 20
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performed.17 The student is then asked to consider whether, if all formali-
ties are abolished, other than the requirement of a written instrument signed
by the grantor, issues similar to those in the principal problem would be
more likely to arise."
IV. RISK OF Loss
Careful reading of statutes means learning to discern what a statute
does not provide, as well as what it does. Playing off the Uniform Vendor
and Purchaser Risk Act ("UVPRA"),19 in comparison with ULTA's
provision dealing with destruction of premises,z° can work well to teach
that lesson. The former, adopted in about a dozen states, specifies the pur-
chaser's remedy when all or a material part of improvements is destroyed
after the execution of a contract of sale but before title or possession has
been transferred.2' It also specifies the purchaser's lack of remedy when
all or any part of improvements is destroyed after title or possession has
been transferred.22 I ask students for UVPRA's solution when, before title
or possession is transferred, a casualty diminishes the value of the improve-
ments only to a nonmaterial extent. Frequently, I get a non-existent
UVPRA solution. Contrasting section 2-406(b)(2) of the ULTA, which
provides for this eventuality, with the UVPRA, which does not, should
clinch the lesson.
Professor Goldstein contrasts the UVPRA's and ULTA's treatments of
risk of loss for a different purpose. The former provides that, when the loss
occurring before title or possession is transferred is material, the vendor
cannot enforce the contract and the purchaser is entitled to recover her down
payment.23 The latter gives the purchaser, under the same circumstances,
the option of cancelling the contract and recovering any down payment or
enforcing the contract and accepting the property with an abatement in
purchase price.24 Goldstein calls for students to think critically about
ULTA by asking "[clan you think of situations in which it would be plainly
17. Id. at 784 (discussing Brussack, supra note 4, at 561). Similarly, the author of this
article took the position that the formality of acknowledgment creates more problems than
it cures. See Mattis, supra note 4, at 528.
18. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 784.
19. U.V.P.R.A. (1935).
20. U.L.T.A. § 2-406(b).
21. U.V.P.R.A. § l(a).
22. Id. § l(b).
23. Id. § 1(a).
24. U.L.T.A. § 2-406(b)(1).
1996] 1101
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unfair to require the seller to give up her property in return for a sharply
reduced price?"2
Professors Rabin and Kwall also compare ULTA with the UVPRA,
noting that ULTA is more comprehensive. The authors quote section 2-406
of ULTA and ask several questions about it, the most provocative of which
is whether the lack of specificity of UVPRA might make it a more attractive
alternative than the ULTA provision.26
Professor Chused quotes section 2-406 of ULTA to illustrate the trend
toward rejecting the traditional rule placing the risk of loss on the buyer
after the execution of a contract to purchase land.' He then focuses on the
buyer's option of price modification or obtaining the benefit of seller's
insurance coverage under ULTA. Chused suggests that ULTA's allocation
of insurance proceeds to the buyer, when the value of the premises has not
been affected by the casualty, may be inappropriate. This suggestion,
together with background facts Chused has uncovered 28 about his chosen
lead case,29 makes the students' critical examination of the issue irresist-
ible.
V. RMEDIES
A. Specific Performance
The old notion of the specific performance remedy was that mutuality
required the remedy to be available to sellers because it was available to
buyers. To illustrate a setting in which the old rule has become difficult to
sustain, Professor Chused uses a case in which a buyer breached a contract
to buy a unit in a high-rise condominium project. Indeed, the court denied
25. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 64; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 236. The issue is
also discussed in the hornbook by ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY
743-44 (2d ed. 1993).
26. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 1040-41.
27. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 847-48.
28. Chused frequently enriches and brings reality to his material by digging up
background information concerning the lives and histories of the characters in the cases. For
example, through a telephone conversation with the buyers of a condominium unit, Chused
found out why they really breached their contract. Id. at 822 (discussing Centex Homes
Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974)). Chused also discovered why
the seller of the condominium unit sought specific performance. Id. Through the transcript
of the trial testimony of the sellers' agent in Skelly Oil Co. v. Ashmore, 365 S.W.2d 582
(Mo. 1963), Chused discovered the value to the buyer of a building that was destroyed by
fire between execution of the contract and closing. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 850.
29. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 834 (discussing Skelly Oil Co., 365 S.W.2d at 582).
1102 [Vol. 20
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the remedy to the seller.30 In his notes following the case, Chused quotes
sections 2-506 and 2-511 of ULTA, which treat the seller's action for the
price differently from the buyer's right to obtain title. The student, when
asked how the case would be decided under ULTA, is led to consider the
ramifications of abandoning the mutuality of remedy doctrine.
Professor Goldstein notes that "section 2-506(b) of the ULTA would
give seller specific performance only if she is unable after reasonable effort
to resell ... at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate
the effort would be unavailing. '32 Section 2-504 provides that if seller
resells the land reasonably and in good faith, her damages are measured
from the time of resale rather than from the time of breach.33 Professor
Goldstein wants the student to consider whether the two sections, taken
together, will produce results different from those produced by seeking
specific performance and damages under existing law.34
B. Seller's Obligation to Provide Marketable Title and Buyer's
Remedies for Breach of that Obligation
In their assignment about failure of marketable title, Professors Rabin
and Kwall present a problem and cases with which to solve the problem.
At the conclusion of the cases, the authors set forth the substance of the
relevant ULTA sections on seller's obligation to provide marketable title at
the time of conveyance. 35 The student is then given an opportunity to
contrast ULTA's provisions with leading case law and apply both to solve
the problem.
When a seller is unable to convey because of a title defect of which the
seller had no knowledge at the time of entering into the contract, should the
buyer only be entitled to restitution of any amounts paid on the contract
price and incidental damages; or should the buyer be entitled to loss of
bargain damages, regardless of seller's good faith? Rabin and Kwall use
section 2-510(b) of the ULTA to illustrate the former position,36 derived
from the eighteenth century English case of Flureau v. Thornhill.37 In
30. Centex Homes Corp., 320 A.2d at 194.
31. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 828-29.
32. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 226.
33. U.L.T.A. § 2-504.
34. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 226.
35. RABIN & KwALL, supra note 8, at 910-11 (citing U.L.T.A. §§ 2-304, -305, -510).
36. Id. at 883, 911.
37. 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (C.P. 1776); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 226 (discussing
ULTA position limiting buyer to restitution where seller is unable to convey because of title
1996] 1103
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contrast, the California Civil Code provides for loss of bargain damages in
the case of a breaching seller (as well as of a breaching buyer), regardless
of seller's knowledge of a title defect when seller executed the contract.38
The authors ask the student to consider which rule is preferable. 9
Discussions about remedies can lead students to think about the
practical ramifications to plaintiffs of civil wrongs, the proper role of
defendants' culpability, and where theoretical consistency fits into the
picture.
VI. RECORDING
Property law teachers sometimes use recording acts to emphasize the
nature of acquisition of title by adverse possession. Recording acts usually
provide that "instruments" or "conveyances" must be recorded in order for
the taker of an interest in real property to maintain first-in-time priority
against subsequent takers. If A's interest is acquired by possession adverse
to 0, it is not derived from an instrument or conveyance; rather it is an
original title. Hence, it is not affected by the recording act. If 0 later
conveys to B, even though A is no longer in possession, B is not protected.
Rejecting that result, USLTA provides that "a purchaser for value who has
recorded his conveyance [B] also acquires the real estate free of any
subsisting adverse claim, [e.g., that of the adverse possessor A] ... unless
the adverse claim is ... inconsistent with the record title to the extent the
use or occupancy would be revealed by reasonable inspection or inquiry."'
This would mean that the adverse possessor not wishing to remain in
possession would have to bring a quiet title action to place her title on
record to avoid the possibility of a recording subsequent purchaser's
prevailing over her. Professors Rabin and Kwall use this context to
stimulate the discussion of whether the USLTA rule should be generally
adopted. In the process, students revisit the basic difference between
derivative title, acquired by an instrument or conveyance, and original title.
Sailing on a different tack in the sea of recording, Professor Browder
and coauthors explore the mechanics of recording.41 They quote from the
prefatory note of USLTA, indicating that USLTA gives "[c]onsiderable
defect unknown to seller at time of entering into contract).
38. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3306, 3307 (Deering 1996).
39. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 883.
40. U.S.L.T.A. § 3-202(a)(2) (emphasis added).
41. OLIN L. BROWDER ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 846-47 (5th ed. 1989).
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attention... to the mechanics of the recording system and to the division
of functions among the various participants in the process." 42
The recording officer is given discretion in the development of systems
for modernization and automation of recording operations and is given
the responsibility for moving toward a system of at least limited
geographic indexing. At the same time, in anticipation of the eventual
computerization of the recording system, the recording office is relieved
of all responsibility for making conclusions about the legal effects of
documents submitted for recording. The office of state recorder is
created to allow for coordination and sharing of experience in the
modernization of recording practices.43
After stating that, unfortunately, state legislatures have shown little
interest in USLTA or its concepts,44 the authors imply a possible rea-
son-at least for the lack of interest in modernizing the mechanics of the
recording system. In many areas of the nation, there is little search activity
in the average recorder's office. Title plants, owned by abstract or title
insurance companies, have taken over most searches. They arrange their
records on a tract-index basis, obviating chain-of-title problems that so
plague first-year law students trying to understand grantor-grantee searches.
The importance of expensive reform of public records is diminished by
computerization and tract indexing in the private sector.
VII. MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACTS
One topic usually introduced in first-year property law courses is the
various marketable record title acts adopted in some eighteen states.
Informing students about the attempts to limit title searches to a reasonable
period of time can be a daunting task. Some coursebooks attempt to do this
by presenting a case or two discussing one or more particular provisions of
a particular state statute. At least three coursebooks make efficient use of
USLTA as a teaching device by setting forth Article 3, Part 3, "Marketable
Record Title," in its entirety, or virtually in its entirety.45 In the clearest
42. Id. (quoting U.S.L.T.A. prefatory note).
43. U.S.L.T.A. prefatory note.
44. The authors note that § 119.07 of the Florida Statutes is an exception. It provides
for protection of computer software developed by public agencies to facilitate access to
records. BROWDER, supra note 41, at 847.
45. Id. at 895-99; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 7, at 581-85; DONAHUE, supra note 7, at
622-24. The Donahue coursebook also sets forth USLTA curative provisions. Id at 620-21.
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form of statutory exposition, this part of USLTA gives students a model
marketable title act, which is derived from legislation originally adopted in
Michigan,46 and subsequently in several other states. The Donahue
coursebook follows quotation of the relevant provisions of USLTA with four
problems exploring whether the Act would render a title marketable and
whether a searcher could safely rely on a search back to "the root of
title."'47 The coursebook by Bruce and Ely asks questions to test the
students' understanding of the Act and to explore possible constitutional
problems.48
A fourth coursebook sets forth the prefatory note to USLTA's
marketable record title provisions, describing what the Act attempts to
accomplish.49 In notes following the quotation, the authors then discuss
whether a thirty or forty-year time period is preferable, who benefits and
what interests are protected under the Act, and exclusions from the Act.50
VIII. EXCEPTIONS AND RESERVATIONS
Distinctions between exceptions and reservations in deeds have long
been arcane. Cases dealing with whether an exception or reservation can be
made in favor of a third-party are grist for the mill of study about the
creation of servitudes. In Rabin and Kwall's first-year property law
coursebook, the authors present a problem containing such an issue,51
followed by relevant cases. 2 The clear solution of section 2-204(b) of
USLTA is quoted: "An exception or reservation of an interest in real estate
may be made in favor of a person not a party to the conveyance or who has
no other interest in the real estate."53 The authors follow with the ques-
tion, provocative to a first-year law student: "If a court faced with the
46. See U.S.L.T.A. § 3 pt. 3, cmt.
47. DONAHUE, supra note 7, at 624-25.
48. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 7, at 585. This coursebook also contains excerpts from
Report, Residential Real Estate Transactions: The Lawyer's Proper Role - Services -
Compensation, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 581, 595-98 (1979), referring to USLTA's
marketable title act as deserving "serious consideration by the organized bar and state
legislatures." BRUCE & ELY, supra note 7, at 577, 579.
49. BERGER & JOHNSTONE, supra note 8, at 947-48.
50. Id. at 950-53.
51. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 362.
52. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972)
(holding that a "reservation" can be made in favor of third-party, but an "exception" cannot
vest part of grantor's interest in third-party); Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d 309
(N.Y. 1987) (finding no reservation in favor of third-party).
53. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 378 (quoting U.S.L.T.A. § 2-204(b)).
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Principal Problem wanted to follow the rule of section 2-204(b), could it
draw any support from this section even if the legislature has not adopted
this section?"'54 Indeed, courts have drawn support from the ULTA and
USLTA sections, even though the Acts remain unadopted by legislatures.
55
IX. RECASTING LAND FINANCING DEVICES
Professor Goldstein uses ULTA's goal in its secured transactions
sections to kindle students' thinking about whether the immense variety of
land finance devices could be unified and made more coherent. Goldstein
leads students through the history of mortgage law from the dead pledge
through the equity of redemption and foreclosure developments and
discusses the deed of trust, the installment land contract, the lease with
option to buy, and the equitable mortgage. Doctrinal distinctions, such as
title, intermediate, and lien theory of mortgages, with little practical
consequence, further complicate the picture. At the conclusion of this
section in his coursebook, Goldstein's discussion of ULTA's Article 3, "Se-
cured Transactions," is refreshing. Article 3 is aimed at consolidating the
various forms of land finance into a single, integrated system. A simple and
unified structure would "'go forward with greater certainty and less
transaction costs,"' than the present variety of land finance forms, often used
to obscure their intent to create security interests in real estate.56 The fact
that the ULTA has not been adopted by any state should not obscure the
drafters' vision that the proposed law could provide a better way.57
54. Id. A similar question is posed with regard to the ULTA provision that all
covenants of title, whether present or future, run in favor of remote grantees. U.L.T.A. § 2-
313(a). Can this provision be used for the benefit of a remote grantee even though no
legislature has adopted it?
55. Korngold, supra note 3, at 1071-73.
56. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 419 (quoting introductory comment to Article 3 of
ULTA).
57. Goldstein uses other sections of ULTA to describe, clarify, summarize, or compare
various approaches. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 96 (citing U.L.T.A. § 2-301-re-
jection of time is of the essence enforcement); id. at 128-29 (citing U.L.T.A. §§ 2-504, -506
-innovations in vendors' remedies); id. at 178-79 (citing U.L.T.A. § 1-309--abolition of
doctrine of merger, U.L.T.A. § 2-402-possibilities that preclosing undertakings may govern
post-closing rights; U.L.T.A. § 2-306-implication of title warranties in deed; U.L.T.A. §§
2-308, -309-warranties of quality); id. at 397 (citing U.L.T.A. § 3-208-prevention of lender
double-dipping by exercise of due-on-sale acceleration and collection of prepayment penalty
from protected party); id. at 405 (citing U.L.T.A. § 1-313-exception to holder in due course
status favoring protected parties executing second or more junior liens); see also GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 7, at 280-81 (discussing abolition of merger doctrine and implication of title
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Professor Chused compares the holding of a leading Indiana case"8
with ULTA's definition of "secu'rity interest," requiring the use of foreclo-
sure in installment land contracts and all settings in which land is used as
collateral for credit.59
X. CONCLUSION
This author is not so optimistic as she was in 1981' about teaching
ULTA and USLTA in law schools as a method of countering their rejection
by state legislatures. The use of the uniform acts in law classrooms and
coursebooks has achieved admirable goals tangential to the purpose of the
Uniform Commissioners in undertaking their task.
The use of ULTA and USLTA in classrooms and coursebooks has
provided a context for thinking about the proper roles of the legislative and
judicial branches; for preventing or curing caseblindness (perhaps better
termed "statute blindness") as students learn to read statutes; for interpreting
statutes, including considering the weight of drafters' commentary; for
thinking about the efficacy of proposed solutions to solve perceived
problems without creating worse ones; and of practical or economic
ramifications of civil wrongs and remedies. If the uniform acts, though
unadopted, facilitate these and other opportunities for learning, good for
them and the coursebook authors and classroom teachers who use them.
warranties in deeds).
58. Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974)
(holding a conditional land sales contract to be in the nature of a secured transaction, the
provisions of which are subject to all proper and just remedies at law and in equity).
59. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 854, 863-64. Chused analyzes the ULTA's definition of
"security interest," recognizing that legal arrangements established under one legal construct,
like a lease, may actually serve the purposes of a quite different legal construct, like a
mortgage. Id. at 870. "But [the ULTA] is very indefinite about the circumstances in which
the language used in the documents will be 'pierced."' Id.
60. See Mattis, supra note 4, at 512; see also supra text accompanying note 6.
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